



**RURAL SYNERGIES**



# **GENERAL RESULTS**

*Building bridges between social and  
productive inclusion policies*



RURAL SYNERGIES



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## Synergies between social protection and rural productive development programmes. Results and recommendations of the experience of Latin America and Africa

### KEY MESSAGES

**C**oordination between social protection and rural productive development programmes can help poor and at-risk households escape the poverty trap and break its intergenerational transmission. Although these evaluations were performed before the socio-economic crisis caused by COVID-19, the results are promising in terms of their contribution to increasing households' resilience to external shocks. This constitutes an important argument in favour of promoting strategies of this nature in the economic reactivation of the rural sector.

Based on these premises, this document presents the results of the impact evaluation and institutional analysis of synergies and complementary areas between social protection and rural productive development programmes in seven countries in Latin America and Africa.

The results associated with productive variables vary by country, by evaluation, and by study programmes. However, it can be concluded that positive effects were found with respect to productive assets, hourly dedication to working in secondary activities, the quantity of agricultural products, average herd size and crop production, among various others.

The results point to important positive effects of the interaction between productive projects and social protection programmes in terms of food security and nutrition.

In terms of psychological and social variables, the evaluations found that interventions of productive projects and social protection programmes have positive effects on expectations, aspirations, social capital, subjective wellbeing, empowerment, and hope.

Case studies that include poverty variables have identified a reduction in poverty gaps or in multidimensional poverty indices.

In terms of access to financial services, the results are positive. Specifically, on the number of households that are making savings, the amount of savings, and the fact that they no longer resort to informal loans to such a great extent.

Although impacts in terms of income are not evident in all cases, some studies, such as the evaluations of Lesotho and Peru, found positive impacts in terms of household income.

These positive results prompt us to continue the search for synergies between social and productive programmes.

Although political support plays a key role in promoting this type of coordination, it is not sufficient if institutional resistance and inertia are not taken into account, and if there is no coherent design with the proper technical conditions and viable incentives.

A constant resistance has been observed among ministries to work together. While in Africa the ministries of Agriculture are more consolidated and occupy an important space in public policy, in Latin America it is the Ministries of Development or Social Protection that have the greatest technical and budgetary capacity. However, this does not alter the conditions of resistance in both sectors.

A set of technical mechanisms exist that can help generate incentives and promote coordination. The most significant of these are budgetary, targetting, and an adequate definition of the target population.

Vertical coordination is an aspect that should be taken into account, as many design difficulties are resolved during the implementation phase. In some cases, mechanisms of informal coordination managed to resolve problems at territorial level, guaranteeing the implementation of actions, but with no clear line of vertical coordination.



## CASE STUDIES

### Latin America: Colombia, Mexico and Peru

Two case studies were conducted in **Colombia**, focusing on programmes that began to be implemented in 2011 to serve families that were victims of the armed conflict. The first study examined the Familias en su Tierra (FEST) programme and the Estrategia de Acompañamiento Familiar y Comunitario (Estrategia UNIDOS), both run by the Department for Social Prosperity. The second case study analysed the Programa Proyectos Productivos (PPP), run by the Special Administrative Unit for Land Management and Restitution (i.e., the Land Restitution Unit, URT), and its relationship with the conditional monetary transfer programme, and Familias en Acción (FeA), also run by the Department for Social Prosperity.

For **Mexico**, the Proyecto de Inclusión Productiva Rural (PROINPRO) was analysed, both in its coordination with the PROSPERA – Programa de Inclusión Social – the main programme for conditional cash transfers, and is administered by the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL)–, and with the productive development programmes (PDP) that are provided by different ministries at federal executive level.

The case study for **Peru** focused on the Programa Nacional de Apoyo Directo a los más Pobres – Juntos, and its coordination with Haku Wiñay (HW). The former was run by the Ministry of Social Development and Inclusion (MIDIS), while the rural productive development programme, Haku Wiñay was implemented by the Social Development Cooperation Fund (FONCODES), which is also part of the aforementioned Ministry. A soft skills strengthening component based on coaching was also evaluated.

In the two for of Colombia and the for of Peru, an impact evaluation was carried out. This gathered information on the actual changes in the lives of the programme beneficiaries, in order to show whether, and to what extent, the interven-

tions have achieved effective changes in the behaviour and characteristics of their beneficiaries. In all three cases, the impact evaluation is accompanied by a qualitative evaluation to ascertain synergies between the programmes.

In addition to the analysis of the impact evaluation, an institutional analysis was also carried out in all cases, including Mexico. The purpose of this analysis was to examine the institutional, formal and informal mechanisms and levels of coordination that contribute to the effectiveness of the coordination between the programmes and/or components of social protection and rural productive development.

### African cases: Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mali and Zambia

In **Ethiopia**, the case study was intended to evaluate the coherence between social protection, health, nutritional services and agriculture. For this purpose, the institutional analysis assessed the linkages between the implementation of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), and the Improved Nutrition through Integrated Basic Social Services with Social Cash Transfer (IN-SCT) pilot project. A quantitative evaluation was also conducted to assess the impacts of PSNP + IN-SCT on productive outcomes.

The case of **Lesotho** was based on an institutional analysis of the different policy stakeholders involved in the implementation of the two programmes, i.e. the Child Grants Programme (CGP) and the Sustainable Poverty Reduction through Income, Nutrition and Access to Government Services (SPRINGS) programme. The study combined impact evaluation methods to analyse direct and indirect impacts of CGP and SPRINGS on their beneficiaries, along with their spillover effects on local economies.



For **Mali**, the case study identified the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional architecture of the national social protection policy, and assessed the quality of the linkages and synergies with the country's agricultural policies and programmes. The institutional analysis was undertaken via a qualitative approach to understand the coordination between social protection and agricultural sectors (i) at national level, and (ii) in the case of the Nioro Cash+ Project. The quantitative study also used an impact evaluation methodology to assess the impacts of the Nioro Cash+ Project on its beneficiaries with respect to various aspects of livelihood.

Finally, the case study for Zambia combined the results of three evaluations, in an attempt to provide a more integrated overview

of the outcomes of the Home Grown School Feeding (HGSF) and the Conservation Agriculture Scale-Up (CASU) programmes. It also combined the findings of the three evaluations by triangulating the results and providing explanations in terms of complementary areas between the programmes or their components.

Figure 1 provides a summary of the cases analysed, including the programmes analysed in each country and case study, the type of institutional architecture, the number of programmes analysed, the purpose of the programmes that are part of each analysis and the types of evaluations carried out.

**Figure 1. Summary of cases analysed**

#### **LATIN AMERICA**

<b>Colombia FEST + UNIDOS</b>	<b>Colombia PPP + FeA</b>	<b>Peru Juntos + Haku Wiñay</b>	<b>Mexico PROINPRO + PDP</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different programmes, with complementary objectives, run by the same institution</li> <li>• 2 programmes</li> <li>• Non-intentional coordination</li> <li>• Impact evaluation and institutional analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different and independent programmes, run by different institutions, that focus (coincidentally) on the same population</li> <li>• 2 programmes</li> <li>• Unintentional coordination</li> <li>• Impact evaluation and institutional analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complementary programmes designed by the same institution, forming an integrated strategy</li> <li>• 2 programmes</li> <li>• Intentional coordination</li> <li>• Impact evaluation and institutional analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different programmes, with complementary objectives, run by different institutions that coordinate with each other</li> <li>• 14 programmes</li> <li>• Intentional coordination</li> <li>• Institutional analysis</li> </ul>

#### **AFRICA**


<b>Ethiopia PSNP + IN-SCT</b>	<b>Lesotho CGP + SPRINGS</b>	<b>Mali Nioro Cash+ Project</b>	<b>Zambia CASU + HGSE</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different programmes, with complementary objectives, run by different institutions that coordinate with each other</li> <li>• 2 programmes</li> <li>• Intentional coordination</li> <li>• Impact evaluation and institutional analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complementary programmes designed by the same institution, forming an integrated strategy</li> <li>• 2 programmes</li> <li>• Intentional coordination</li> <li>• Impact evaluation and institutional analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unique integrated programme</li> <li>• 1 programme</li> <li>• Intentional</li> <li>• Impact evaluation and institutional analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different and independent programmes, run by different institutions, that target (coincidentally) the same population</li> <li>• 2 programmes</li> <li>• Unintentional coordination</li> <li>• Impact evaluation</li> </ul>

## IMPACT EVALUATION RESULTS

Regarding the productive-type variables (Figure 2), positive impacts of the programmes were found in production variables such as productive assets (FEST and PPP), livestock amount (PPP, PSNP + IN-SCT, Nioro Cash+ and CASU + HGSE). Positive results were

also identified for marketing (CASU + HGSE) and access to markets (CGP + SPRINGS). Finally, positive impacts were found in technological variables associated with production (HW).


Figure 2. Results of programmes with positive impacts of productive variables




Positive results were found in analysing variables associated with income, poverty and local economic development (Figure 3). Firstly, the two studies that include poverty indicators in their analysis, PPP and CGP + SPRINGS, identified a reduction in said indicators. Additionally, CGP + SPRINGS and CASU + HGSE included simulation exercises in their analysis in order to identify impacts on local

economies, revealing positive effects on variables associated with income, access to markets and distributional impacts as a result of combining the programmes. Secondly, three studies revealed positive impacts on indicators associated with income (CGP + SPRINGS, Haku Wiñay and CASU + HGSE).

Figure 3. Positive results for variables associated with income, poverty and local economic development





The results associated with **financial** variables showed that the main impacts are on variables associated with savings and different types of loans (Figure 4). When analysing the studies that included savings as the analysis variable, it was found that more households stated that they were making savings (FEST + UNIDOS and CGP + SPRINGS). However, the effect is not only on the number

of households making savings, as an increase was also found in the amount that households save (CGP + SPRINGS). The effects on loans were also positive, revealing reductions in informal loans (FEST + UNIDOS, PPP and CGP + SPRINGS) and increases in formal loans (PPP).

**Figure 4. Positive results for financial variables**


Savings	Increase in households making savings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FEST + UNIDOS</li> <li>• CGP + SPRINGS</li> </ul>	Loans	Increase in formal loans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PPP</li> </ul>
	Increase in the amount households save <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CGP + SPRINGS</li> </ul>		Reduction in informal loans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FEST + UNIDOS</li> <li>• PPP</li> <li>• CGP + SPRINGS</li> </ul>

In terms of **food security**, all the studies that included this type of variable showed positive results (Figure 5). In some cases, it was noted in the transition in the state of household food security, transiting from moderate/severe food insecurity to mild food insecurity (FEST + UNIDOS and PPP). In other cases, positive impacts were found in terms of the variables of food security

or nutrition (CGP + SPRINGS, Nioro Cash+ and CASU + HGsf). Education variables were included within the same category, with the most representative case being that of Zambia, where the combination of CASU and HGsf led to negative impacts on children's schooling.




Figure 5. Positive results for food security variables



Finally, some of the studies included **psychological and social variables**, among which were subjective well-being, aspirations and expectations, social capital, empowerment, perception of

control of life and hope. The results in this group of variables show that the programmes have a very important role in generating positive impacts on the internal restrictions of household.

Figure 6. Positive results for psychological and social variables



Throughout this section, it has been shown that the studies found that synergies, that is, that the combination of social protection and rural productive development programmes have combined impacts on the groups of variables analysed. Positive synergistic impacts were found on variables such as livestock, market access/market-ing, food security, nutrition, income, savings, loans, and on psychological and social variables. It has also been concluded that the combination of these

two types of programmes can contribute to the reduction of poverty and informal loans and increased strategies to deal with situations of shock. Figure 7 shows the synthesis of the results of impact evaluations, using the groups of variables mentioned above.



Figure 7. Synthesis of the Impact Evaluations results



## PRODUCTIVE

### FEST

- + productive assets
- + dedication to work in secondary activities

### PPP

- + productive assets
- + livestock products
- food crop products

### PSNP + IN-SCT

- + livestock
- + production of livestock by-products
- + average herd size
- + crop production

### CGP + SPRINGS

- + access to markets

### Nioro Cash +

- + livestock production

### Haku Wiñay

- + new technologies

### CASU + HGSF

- + livestock
- + marketing



## INCOME, POVERTY AND LOCALECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

### PPP

- poverty

### CGP + SPRINGS

- poverty gap
- + income
- + consumption

### Haku Wiñay

- + income

### CASU + HGSF

- + total revenues
- poverty (simulation)
- + income distribution (simulation)



## FOOD SECURITY AND EDUCATION

### FEST + UNIDOS

- severe food insecurity
- + mild food insecurity

### PPP

- moderate food insecurity
- + mild food insecurity

### CGP + SPRINGS

- + dietary diversity

### Nioro Cash+

- + food security

### CASU + HGSF

- + food security
- schooling



## FINANCES AND RISKS

### FEST + UNIDOS

- + savings
- informal loans

### PPP

- + formal loans
- informal loans

### CGP + SPRINGS

- + households saving and borrowing money
- + money saved and borrowed
- negative coping strategies
- + willingness to take risks



## PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL

### FEST + UNIDOS

- + subjective well-being
- + expectations
- + social capital

### PPP

- + empowerment
- + subjective well-being
- + social capital

### Nioro Cash +

- + aspirations for children's education

### Haku Wiñay

- + locus of control

### Haku Wiñay + Soft Skills Programme

- + internal locus of control
- powerful others index

## RESULTS BY COUNTRY

### Latin America

#### COLOMBIA

##### Familias en su Tierra (FEST) and the Estrategia UNIDOS

The results of the evaluation indicate that **synergistic impacts were found between FEST and UNIDOS on variables such as informal savings, food security, perception of wellbeing and social capital**. Firstly, in terms of savings, a positive effect was observed in terms of informal savings for FEST households. Such effects were also identified when the household was served jointly by the two programmes. Furthermore, synergy was observed between FEST and UNIDOS for the informal loans variable whereby participants resorted to this type of loan to a lesser extent.

Synergy was found between the two interventions also for the variables relating to **food security**. FEST contributes in reducing severe food insecurity and increasing the percentage of households in mild food insecurity. When analyzing those households that received both programs, an increase was observed in the percentage of households entering mild insecurity from more severe forms of insecurity, confirming the transition towards food security. On the other hand, although the effect of UNIDOS on food security variables is not direct, the talks by the co-managers of UNIDOS reinforce healthy eating habits, which can also be strengthened through the implementation of home gardens promoted by FEST, which would combine efforts.

In subjective-type variables, such as **aspirations and expectations**, it was found that FEST improved the participants' perception of themselves thanks to the strengthening of productive activity. Likewise, the two programmes functioned thanks to the fact that the participants had improved their situation and consequently felt more at ease, comfortable and animated. Regarding

social capital, it was found that the interventions positively affected the perception of collaborative work, support and cooperation among the participants, through community work in the FEST projects, as well as in the meetings and formation of social organisations promoted by the Estrategia UNIDOS.

#### COLOMBIA

##### Programa Proyectos Productivos (PPP)

The evaluation results suggest that the programme generated **positive effects with respect to different variables**. It was found that the greatest growth achieved by households was in the **value of their assets**, which happens when they are near to consolidating the Productive Project, and becomes stable once participation in the programme has concluded. It was also found that the number of livestock products increases as exposure to the programme increases. However, in contrast to this result, and over a period of time, households were found to reduce their agricultural output. In spite of this, after the 45th month of exposure, an upward trend was again noted in the diversification of both agricultural and livestock products, which suggests that the reduction in crop output was a temporary strategy while the productive system was being organised.

The study identified positive results in terms of **poverty and food security**. It was found that households reduced their level of poverty, and regarding food security, the analysis showed that during their time of exposure to the programme, households seemed to be transitioning from moderate insecurity to mild insecurity. After the 40th month, both types of insecurity were found to be reduced, which would imply that households move consistently towards a state of food security.



Regarding the effects related to financial services, it was observed that households reduced their probability of using informal loans (under usurious conditions) by, on average, 30%, and increased the probability of resorting to formal loans by 20%.

Finally, a positive impact was also identified with respect to participation in the programme, or other interventions on the **households' perception of wellbeing, social capital and empowerment**. Specifically, it was established that coordination between the PPP and other interventions has allowed the strengthening of formal and informal community organisations; productive projects have impacts on the perception of well-being from the start of implantation and even after graduation. Graduated households presented an increase of around 20 percentage points on the scale of roles, and showed improvements in the sharing of household chores.

## PERU

The results of Haku Wiñay have been positive in various dimensions. The programme revealed an **increase in annual income** of almost PEN 1,400 (US\$ ppp 803) for those population centres that were initially incorporated. This is a considerable rise in income that represents an increase of more than 30% compared to that of households in population centres that were not initially assigned to the programme.

**Changes were also observed in the technologies used for agricultural activities, with programme beneficiaries able to adopt new technologies.** The results point to an increase in the cultivation of vegetables, in the use (more than in the preparation) of fertilisers, in sprinkler irrigation, and in the area of pastures cultivated. Positive impacts were also noted with respect to the use of sheds for the rearing of small animals. While these results underline the success of the programme and partly

explain the observed change in income, it remains to be seen whether the use of these technologies will continue in the future. Most of these changes are the result of using and applying the elements and teachings that the programme has promoted, so it is not possible to determine whether the use of these technologies will persist over time, or whether the captured effect is solely due to the transfer of assets and supervision carried out through the programme.

Regarding the **psychological** variables, the evaluation found that having an initial Locus of Control Index above the median had a positive effect on the level of total income in the results. The locus of Control Index measures a person's perception of control over their life.

Finally, regarding the **evaluation of the supplementary soft skills programme that HW beneficiaries** received, the results show that the probability of using sheds for guinea pigs increased by 17%. This is an important result, given that almost 30% of the coaching participants proposed as their plan of action the incorporation of technology and thus increased their production of guinea pigs and income. Furthermore, it was found that for **psychological** variables, participating in **coaching** increases the internality index and reduces the powerful others index.<sup>1</sup> This means that there is an increase in the belief that one's life is determined by one's actions, but at the same time an increase in the belief that there are people in the locality who end up influencing these outcomes.



<sup>1</sup> The Locus of Control Index is made up of the Internality, Powerful Others and Chance indices: the first refers to how much a person believes that they have control over their own life; the second and third refer to whether a person considers that the events of their life are controlled by other people or by chance, respectively.



## Africa

### ETHIOPIA

This study was based on a double difference approach with inverse probability weighting (IPW), using three groups: the treatment group, made up of IN-SCT beneficiaries; the “pure control” group, which included households in the same communities as the targeted households, but that were neither PSNP clients nor were they supported by IN-SCT; and the PSNP4-only group made up of PSNP clients (new and existing). Additionally, the study involved two samples for the analysis: a mother-child sample and households with children under-5.

The results of the evaluation showed that, in the mother-child sample, the PSNP + IN-SCT has produced some positive **productive impacts**, especially in the livestock sector, where both the share of households owning **livestock** and the **average herd size** have increased substantially. The PSNP + IN-SCT also led to increased **production of livestock**, while the impacts on revenues from sales of by-products were not significant. There were limited positive impacts on the harvest of cash crops, whose production increased.

The area of operated land was also unaffected by the programme. Thus, the **increases in crop production** may be the result of improved **land productivity** from the use of better production technology, changes in crop portfolio, or increased on-farm labour supply, among other possible causes. As for the hypothesis of **improved production technology**, the evaluation found that the PSNP + INSCT led to an increase in the spread of ploughs and in the average number of pack animals. It did not find reduced exposure to crop shocks such as plant diseases and weeds. The study documented an increase in **crop diversification** as a

result of the PSNP + IN-SCT intervention. Finally, a reduction in paid labour supply was found in both the agriculture and nonagricultural sector. Outside of farm production, the PSNP + IN-SCT also led to increased **non-farm entrepreneurial activity**, lending support to the idea of enhanced diversification of livelihoods.

In the sample of households with children under-5, the PSNP + IN-SCT produced almost **no productive impacts** with very few exceptions. The share of those involved in livestock and the average herd size were not affected by the programme. The study did not document any impacts on production and revenues from sales of livestock by-products. In the crop sector, the programme led to a reduction of the share of cereal growers, while more farmers started growing ensete ventricosum<sup>2</sup>. The average harvest was unaffected with respect to all major crops.

### LESOTHO

This impact evaluation was carried out to assess the combined impacts of the CGP and SPRINGS. The evaluation has three treatment groups: i) households receiving both CGP and SPRINGS; ii) households receiving CGP but not SPRINGS; iii) households receiving neither the CGP nor SPRINGS. The results of the evaluation show that, in terms of household welfare and poverty, the effect of CGP + SPRINGS reduces the **poverty gap**. Concerning **income and market engagement**, the evaluation found a substantial increase in income from sales of fruits and vegetables in the group of households benefitting from both programmes.

Regarding **Financial inclusion and risk behaviour**, the evaluation found that the combination of the CGP and SPRING resulted in a significant rise in the share of households **saving and borrowing money**, with an increase of almost 370% and 115%, respectively. The



<sup>2</sup> Ensete is a banana-like plant, which is why it is also called the false banana or Ethiopian banana. It has an extensive presence in Ethiopia. Its edible root is used for the production of kocho (a traditional bread).

### **amount of money saved and borrowed**

also increased by approximately 100%. A reduction of **negative coping strategies** was found; i.e., in terms of cutting out meals, falling into debt, being forced to borrow from loan sharks in emergencies, engaging in daily piece work, or child labour.

In terms of nutrition, dietary practices and knowledge, the qualitative and quantitative analyses showed that the programmes resulted in an improvement of **dietary diversity** due to an increase in the consumption of green vegetables, fruits, organic meat, dairy and legumes.

Finally, the research investigated the impact of CGP and CGP + SPRINGS on the **local economy**, studying the effect of the programmes on **market demand and supply**. Four main findings emerged from the LEWIE analysis. Firstly, CGP created both nominal and real income multipliers. Secondly, combining CGP with keyhole gardens and savings groups, individually or in combination, led to higher real income multipliers. Thirdly, the combination of CGP with increased access to markets, which is supposed to reduce transaction costs, increased the real income impacts of CGP and CGP + SPRINGS. Finally, LEWIE analysis has produced results in terms of the cost-effectiveness of CGP and CGP + SPRINGS. The findings showed that CGP, alone and in combinations with SPRINGS components, generates total discounted benefits that exceed discounted programme costs.

## **MALI**

The study evaluated the effectiveness and impacts of the Nioro Cash+ Project, using three comparison groups: i) Cash only households, ii) Cash+ households, and iii) non-beneficiary households. The evaluation results showed that the **Nioro Cash+ Project** supported **livestock production** through the distribution of goats and the provision of livestock health monitoring to each household benefitting from the Cash+ kit. A significant increase was observed in livestock production among the Cash+ beneficiaries. The **average gross income from livestock** of said beneficiaries was, respectively, 68.5% and 88.2% greater than it would have been if they had been in the control group or received Cash Only. Households receiving Cash+ also had a **volume of livestock** that was 85.4% higher than if they had received Cash Only. However, the qualitative study revealed that the quantity of livestock feed given to the Cash+ beneficiaries (50 kg) was not sufficient for the duration of the project, leading some people to buy more with their own money, which may have been to the detriment of other vital human needs.

In terms of **food security**, the study identified a significant impact of the Cash+ treatment on its beneficiaries, compared to the situation where they had not been included in the programme. On average, the proportion of households who never had to worry about having enough food increased by 70.5% with Cash+. The Cash+ beneficiaries were also 7.1% less likely to experience any level of food insecurity than if they had received Cash Only.

Regarding aspirations and expectations, the study observed positive impacts of the programme on **aspirations for children's education**. The Cash Only and Cash+ beneficiaries were 51.9% and 16.3%, respectively, more likely to aspire that their children would reach university level compared to non-beneficiaries.

## ZAMBIA

The impact evaluation was based on a post-test only non-equivalent control group design, with only one wave of post-intervention data. The evaluation included 4 groups: HGSE-only; CASU-only; HGSE + CASU and the Control group.

The study evaluated impacts on production and welfare variables. For farm **production outcomes**, CASU and CASU + HGSE generated mostly positive effects, while HGSE featured mixed impacts. In terms of **farmers' commercialisation**, maize and groundnuts. CASU + HGSE increased the number of merchants more than each program alone. Additionally, **total revenues** increased in the three treatment groups, a result generally backed up by the qualitative study when it reported that households have changed their use of harvests, from mostly keeping products for household consumption to now being able to both consume and sell.

Furthermore, the share of farmers engaged in **raising livestock** was around 80% for the CASU-only and combined groups; however, there was a 60% fall in the control group and a 43% decrease in the HGSE group. Additionally, the CASU and the combined programmes led to considerable increases in the share of farmers **dealing with by-products**. The analysis also focused on farmers' **involvement in livestock markets** in terms of spread and sale revenues. The animals traded most were goats and chickens, while between 10% and 23% of farmers sold small ruminants in the 12 months preceding the surveys. Concerning **total income**, the combined treatment increased gross income by around 43%, driven mostly by the crop sector and non-farm business sales.

Regarding **food security and schooling indicators**, the study highlighted the positive effects of offering meals on both groups of households. However, following closer examination, and taking into account the impacts of HGSE, the impacts on schooling were cancelled out and those on food security turned negative. The CASU project had positive impacts on food security, while not affecting schooling decisions, as was expected. The combination of CASU and HGSE led to positive impacts on food security and some negative impacts on schooling.

Finally, the micro-simulation exercise explored the **distributional impacts of combining the HGSE programme and CASU project**. In the case of the productive support of CASU and the local purchases programme of HGSE, the results showed that prior to the intervention, participants were generally less poor than those not participating in the programmes. In terms of the overall income distribution, CASU and HGSE have a slightly equalizing effect. Micro-simulation of the school meals component of HGSE showed that if school catering were to be scaled up to reach universal coverage, it would increase school attendance rates by 4.7%, on average, as compared with a scenario with no school catering.



### Recommendations derived from impact evaluations

- The results of the impact evaluations endorse the programmes based on cash transfers as effective tools to reduce food insecurity and poverty. However, the approaches are more successful insofar as they incorporate dimensions of productive promotion that provide more structural support to the exit from poverty. It is also advisable to consider advice and support interventions, which appear as elements of significant importance in the transformation of greater monetary resources into better diets or better technologies.
- It is recommended to include in the programme activities focusing on strengthening community or collective initiatives, as well as the strengthening of soft skills, as it would appear that these provide greater robustness to the positive impacts derived from the transfers. Moreover, the promotion of these types of initiatives is particularly relevant in terms of generating improvements in perceptions of well-being and the empowerment of beneficiaries, and thus contribute to overcoming poverty traps.
- Another recommendation deals with the design of comprehensive programmes that address these different dimensions simultaneously, in order to discourage competitive uses of household resources, the generation of complementary areas, and the provision of solid pathways to exit poverty.



## SUMMARY OF RESULTS - INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

In the first case study conducted for Colombia, i.e., **FEST and Estrategia UNIDOS**, the analysis indicates that coordination between the two interventions is low, despite the fact that both are implemented by the same institution. Among the obstacles to such coordination are: i) the programmes being offered by the body responsible respond to government priorities, which tend to vary over time<sup>3</sup>; ii) according to these priorities, the programmes have independent objectives and goals that hinder their interaction; iii) there are no incentives for coordination between programmes or entities.

In spite of the above, there do appear to be some **formal and informal coordination opportunities**. At countrywide level, the regional offices for Prosperidad Social related to the programmes, generated formal agreements to include a shared targeting criteria. At local level, the Municipal Coordination Working Groups (MAM), made up by stakeholders with extensive knowledge of the context and processes of participation with the programme beneficiaries, contributed to the coordination of local authorities and those in charge of public programmes.

In the second case study for Colombia, institutional analysis of the **Programa Proyectos Productivos (PPP)** also found important differences between formal and informal opportunities for coordination. The National System of Comprehensive Care and Reparation for Victims (SNARIV), provides a formal framework to guide and coordinate the actions of each institution involved in comprehensive care for victims of the armed conflict. However, it does not manage to provide a conceptual and operational strategy of coordination capable of fostering coordination, as there are no operational guidelines that specifically guide the coordination between institutions and sectors.

In spite of the above, **spontaneous coordination was found at local level between the PPP and other programmes such as Somos Rurales, Familias en Acción, and specific joint interventions with the Municipal Units for Agricultural Technical Assistance (UMATAS)**. However, it was noted that this informal coordination has positive impacts on variables such as savings and social capital.

In the case of **Mexico**, an analysis was made of the Proyecto de Inclusión Productiva Rural (PROINPRO), both in its coordination with the PROSPERA Programa de Inclusión Social, which is the main programme for conditional cash transfers administered by the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL), and with the productive development programmes (PDP) offered by different ministries at federal executive level.

The design of the productive inclusion component of PROSPERA, of which PROINPRO was part, was supported operationally by the Technical Subcommittee on Employment, Income and Savings (STEIA), an entity that was expected to function as a **coordinating node** between PROSPERA and an assortment of PDPs. However, this area of intervention, which had been designed for high-level dialogue and negotiation, progressively lost its potential to bring stakeholders together, and ceased to operate with those representatives who had decision-making powers. It thus stopped being a mechanism for establishing agreements and commitments on public policy.

The failure of STEIA to fulfil its role as coordinator highlights the need for a viable and simple technical design that defines the **appropriate incentives**. On the one hand, the lack of a designated budget in the Expenditure Budget of the Federation, which would be able to foster coordination and ensure sectoral interventions, translated into a lack of in-



<sup>2</sup> An example of these changes was the decision of the current Colombian government to ensure that in all social protection programmes in the country at least 37% of those targeted are victims of the armed conflict. As a result of this measure, there is better coverage for this particular population segment; however this creates a distortion in overall targeting.



centives for productive development programmes to join the strategy proposed by SEDESOL. On the other hand, the fact that each productive programme had its own target population, which frequently did not coincide with the PROSPERA target population, was not addressed. In other words, the PROSPERA population barely met the requirements for participation and access to the productive supports offered by these programmes.

The case study in **Peru** corresponds to the Programa Nacional de Apoyo Directo a los más Pobres - Juntos and its coordination with Haku Wiñay. In the case of the former, this is a programme run by the Ministry of Social Development and Inclusion (MIDIS), while Haku Wiñay is a programme administered by the Social Development Cooperation Fund (FONCODES), which falls under the same ministry. After a failed attempt to link Juntos with the productive development programmes of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MINAGRI), it was decided to design Haku Wiñay as a complementary programme to Juntos, forming part of the Ministry's economic inclusion strategy.

The analysis concluded that the **problems in coordination between MIDIS and MINAGRI were due to differences in objectives and priorities between the two sectors**, as well as the lack of budgetary incentives. While MIDIS seeks the inclusion of small producers, MINAGRI's focus is rather on promoting agro-exports. This has occurred despite the strong political support of MIDIS and its mandate to coordinate its provision of social programmes with other sectors.

Once Haku Wiñay was created within MIDIS, its coordination with Juntos was defined on the basis of a territorial focus of Haku Wiñay in communities with a high participation of Juntos beneficiaries. However, subsequent changes in Haku Wiñay's targetting criteria have resulted in the loss of the requirement for coordination with Juntos.

Nevertheless, **informal coordination mechanisms were identified at local level thanks to the role played by the local managers of Juntos**. Given that some of the technologies offered by Haku Wiñay are aligned with the objectives of Juntos, local managers have promoted the development of joint activities and undertake work to reinforce messages relevant to both programmes, such as the importance of homestead organic gardening, promoting the construction of a solid waste pit and encouraging the adoption of other technologies promoted by Haku Wiñay.

In the case of **Ethiopia**, an analysis was conducted of the coordination between the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which is a social protection programme run by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Improved Nutrition through Integrated Basic Social Services with Social Cash Transfer (INSCT) pilot programme, which is administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA).

IN-SCT was designed so as to complement the interventions of the PSNP, targetting beneficiaries considered the most vulnerable population segment and sharing the same budget. The implementation of IN-SCT had to deal with the difficulties derived from the **lack of formal binding mechanisms between the ministries involved**, which resulted in the retention of the IN-SCT budget by the Federal Food Security Coordination Directorate (FSCD). This affected activities in terms of gender and social development, nutrition and the link-up of services.

In spite of these difficulties, **formal multi-stakeholder coordination initiatives were established at local level**, which allowed for coordinated work and permanent contact between the different stakeholders involved in the programme. This was one of the key aspects in which IN-SCT provided added value to PSNP.

As a result of the above, the institutional analysis revealed important benefits of the coordination between the sectors involved. Based on this experience, MoLSA has managed to position itself and receive recognition from other larger sectors, which has allowed it to generate more trust in its capabilities. The experience has also generated capacities among the different stakeholders involved, once again to the benefit of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Regarding the case study of **Lesotho**, an analysis was undertaken of the Child Grants Programme (CGP), which is the second most important social assistance programme in the country, and is run by the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), along with an analysis of the Sustainable Poverty Reduction through Income, Nutrition and Access to Government Services (SPRINGS) programme, which is an integrated community development initiative. The latter emerged following a review and the lessons learnt of two previous interventions by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Catholic Relief Services (CRS).

SPRINGS was designed as a complementary programme to CGP, through territorial targetting by SPRINGS in communities with a high proportion of vulnerable population and beneficiaries of social protection (not just CGP). This was the only formal criterion for coordination between the two programmes, and there were no formal coordination mechanisms between them.

The institutional analysis revealed informal coordination mechanisms between the different stakeholders involved and at what levels (central, intermediate and local). Although coordination was weak at the intermediate and central levels, it was stronger at local level. As a consequence of the monthly community council meetings, which included all the NGOs and service providers working within the council, four key stakeholders were able to work together, i.e., auxiliary social workers from the Ministry of Agriculture; agricultural outreach workers from the

Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security; members of the NGOs implementing the initiative; and the council elected by the local community.

The Nioro Cash+ Project in **Mali** is a unique programme that did not consider coordination mechanisms with other ministries at central level. Despite this, the project viewed the local setting as a place to obtain coordination and synergies with other larger-scale initiatives, such as the Emergency Safety Nets Project (Jigisemejiri) and the Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Programme (PLIAM).

The institutional analysis indicates that the coordination function with PLIAM was taken up by the PLIAM coordinator, enabling, for example, the health security component of PLIAM to create strategies for its beneficiaries so as to register with the mutual health insurance funds. Furthermore, agreements were reached with the health centres of the intervention sectors in order to support beneficiaries of the mutual funds. Within the framework of Cash+, meetings were also held with the Coordination and Technical Unit of Mutual Insurers of PLIAM to provide information and encourage Cash+ participants to register voluntarily. With the Jigisemejiri programme, there was no coordination or formal contact, but Cash+ was able to benefit from Jigisemejiri, using the focus committees that the programme created in order to carry out its own targetting process with local participation. The Nioro Cash+ Project excluded Jigisemejiri beneficiaries at the request of the village authorities, so as to avoid overlapping benefits and the exclusion of other households.

With regard to the analysis of the institutional architecture of the national social protection policy and the links with agricultural policies and programmes in Mali, the results point to the robust political commitment of the government to strengthen coordinated policies. However, this does not translate into a willingness to generate coherent mechanisms between the two sectors. Although intersectoral coordination mechanisms

exist at different levels of government, they are subject to difficulties associated with the numerous stakeholders and the lack of coherence of representation in areas of coordination. Moreover, there is a deficient level of compliance in terms of regular meetings, nor are there any clear budgetary mechanisms for coordination between the two sectors.

Figure 3 presents a summary of the results of the institutional analysis. In the first place, formal coordination mechanisms were identified, especially at national level (FEST + UNIDOS, PPP + FeA, PSNP + IN-SCT, CGP + SPRINGS). However, several of these mechanisms were found not to be sufficient for an effective coordination between the programmes. In contrast to the above, the majority of case studies identified

in-formal coordination mechanisms at local level to implement specific actions of the interventions (FEST + UNIDOS, PPP + FeA, Juntos + Haku Wiñay, CGP + SPRINGS, Nioro Cash+ Project). In some cases the targetting and definition processes for the target population were identified as measures that promote coordination (CGP + SPRINGS, PSNP + IN-SCT). Finally, it can be concluded that political willingness is necessary to achieve coordination between social and rural development agendas and programmes. However, this on its own is not enough, and there is a need to have adequate technical conditions such as budgetary provisions, in place as well as to generate incentives for coordination to occur at all levels.

Figure 3. Synthesis of the Institutional Analysis

#### LATIN AMERICA

Colombia FEST + UNIDOS	Colombia PPP + FeA	Peru Juntos + Haku Wiñay	Mexico PROINPRO + PDP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formal agreements at the national level to prioritise targetting criteria</li> <li><b>Low level of coordination</b></li> <li>Informal coordination at the local level for the development of programme activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SNARIV as a coordination strategy</li> <li><b>Low level of coordination, without being able to provide a conceptual and operative coordination strategy</b></li> <li>Informal coordination at the local level with other institutions and programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Changes in the design of Haku Wiñay have changed the coordination.</li> <li><b>Differences in priorities and budgets between sectors</b></li> <li>Informal coordination at the local level between programme managers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Robust political willingness</li> <li><b>Failure of STEIA as a coordinating node. Lack of relevant incentives and budgetary provisions</b></li> <li><b>Differences in the target population and programme requirements</b></li> </ul>

#### AFRICA

Ethiopia PSNP + IN-SCT	Lesotho CGP + SPRINGS	Mali Nioro Cash+ Project
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordination through the targeting of beneficiaries</li> <li><b>Lack of formal linking mechanisms between the ministries involved</b></li> <li>Formal coordination at the local level led to permanent contact with stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordination through territorial targeting with the beneficiaries of social protection</li> <li>Informal coordination at different levels. At the local level this permitted the coordinated work of key stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Formal coordination at the countrywide level not considered</b></li> <li>Informal coordination at the local level with PLIAM</li> <li>There was no contact with Jigisemejiri, but benefits were obtained from their participation mechanisms</li> </ul>


## Recommendations derived from the institutional analysis

- Promoting coordination between social and productive programmes **allows us to respond to the multidimensional nature of the problems and deficiencies that affect the population in a situation of extreme poverty.** We can do this by taking advantage of the potential of synergies between the two types of programmes, as has been identified by the evaluations carried out in this project.
- Special attention should be paid from the design stage, to the role that the local level is expected to play in the implementation of the programmes. This requires an adequate and exhaustive knowledge of the capacities, the stakeholders and the resistances that may be present at local level, so that the strengths of the programmes can be enhanced and any possible risks mitigated.
- **Latin America:** It is recommended that multidimensional programmes should be designed that integrate the social and productive dimensions into a single design managed by a single team. The social dimension should place the focus on equipping the beneficiary population with initial capacities to take better advantage of the productive options that the single programme would offer them. Furthermore, in order to increase the participation of the respective ministries of agriculture in these schemes, there is a need to reinforce the priority they assign to rural development. In this respect, organisations such as IFAD can make a pertinent contribution.
- **Africa:** To continue committing to a strategy of financial and technical support, through cooperation agencies and international NGOs, in order to contribute to the strengthening of ministries and public services. This strengthening must include the design of formal coordination mechanisms that generate adequate incentives for coordination, thus taking advantage of the opportunity that a consolidated institutional framework represents.





# GENERAL RESULTS



# RURAL SYNERGIES

*Building bridges between social and productive inclusion policies*



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