



## Institutionality for social protection and rural productive development programmes coordination. Experiences in Latin America and Africa.

### KEY MESSAGES

Coordination between social protection and rural productive development programmes can help poor and at-risk households escape the poverty trap and break its intergenerational transmission.

In contexts of socioeconomic crisis such as the one we are currently experiencing as a result of the pandemic caused by COVID-19, government responses must protect income through simplified subsidy and cash transfer strategies. Yet, an understanding of the institutional architecture behind the implementation of these coordination schemes is essential to find those convergence strategies that optimise the synergies and complementarities between these interventions.

The analysis of four cases in three Latin American countries and three cases in three African countries underlines the constant resistance of ministries to work with each other.

The agricultural sector tends to prioritise its efforts in promoting larger-scale agriculture, and views small farmers as the target population of the social sector.

While in Africa it is the ministries of agriculture that are more consolidated and occupy an important place in terms of public policy, in Latin America it is the ministries of development or social protection that have a greater technical and budgetary capacity. However, this does not alter such conditions of resistance between the two sectors.

Although political support is necessary to promote this type of coordination, it is not enough to break this resistance: a technical design that ensures adequate incentives in terms of budgeting, targeting and definition of the target population is fundamental.

Vertical coordination is a less considered but a more important aspect, given that many design difficulties are resolved during the implementation phase at territorial level.

### ANALYSED CASES

#### LATIN AMERICA

##### Colombia

##### FEST + UNIDOS

- Different programmes, with complementary objectives, run by the same institution
- 2 programmes
- Non-intentional coordination

##### Colombia

##### PPP + FeA

- Different and independent programmes, run by different institutions, that focus (coincidentally) on the same population
- 2 programmes
- Unintentional coordination

##### Peru

##### Juntos + Haku Wiñay

- Complementary programmes designed by the same institution, forming an integrated strategy
- 2 programmes
- Intentional coordination

##### Mexico

##### PROINPRO + PDPs

- Different programmes, with complementary objectives, run by different institutions that coordinate with each other
- 14 programmes
- Intentional coordination

#### AFRICA

##### Ethiopia

##### PSNP + IN-SCT

- Different programmes, with complementary objectives, run by different institutions that coordinate with each other
- 2 programmes
- Intentional coordination

##### Lestho

##### CPG + SPRINGS

- Complementary programmes designed by the same institution, forming an integrated strategy
- 2 programmes
- Intentional coordination

##### Mali

##### Niuro Cash+ Project

- Single integrated programme
- 1 programme
- Intentional

## SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Colombia FEST UNIDOS	Colombia PPP	Mexico PROINPRO PDPs	Peru Haku Wiñay Juntos
Formal agreements at national level to prioritize targeting criteria	SNARIV as a strategy and architecture of coordination	Robust political willingness	Changes in the design of Haku Wiñay have altered coordination.
Low level of coordination	Low level of coordination, without being able to provide a conceptual and operative coordination strategy	Failure of STEIA as coordinating node. Lack of relevant incentives and budgetary provisions	Differences in priorities and budgets between sectors
Informal coordination at local level for the development of programme activities	Informal coordination at local level with other institutions and programmes	Differences in the target population and programme requirements	Informal coordination at local level between programme managers

Ethiopia PSNP IN-SCT	Lesotho CGP SPRINGS	Mali Nioro Cash+ Project
Coordination through the targeting of beneficiaries	Coordination through territorial targeting with the beneficiaries of social protection	Formal coordination at countrywide level not considered
Lack of formal linking mechanisms between the ministries involved	There were no other formal coordination mechanisms between the two programmes.	Informal coordination at local level with PLIAM
Formal coordination at local level led to permanent contact with stakeholders	Informal coordination at different levels. At local level this permitted the coordinated work of key stakeholders	There was no contact with Jigisemejiri, but benefits were obtained from their participation mechanisms

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- The need to pay special attention, beginning in the design stage, to the role that the local level is expected to play in programme implementation. This requires an adequate and exhaustive knowledge of the capacities, the stakeholders and the resistance that may be present at the local level, so that strengths can be enhanced and any possible risks mitigated.
- **Latin America:** It is recommended to promote the design of multidimensional programmes that integrate the social and productive dimension into a single design that is managed by a single team. The social dimension should place the focus on equipping the beneficiary population with initial capacities to take better advantage of the productive options that the single programme would offer them. Furthermore, in order to increase the participation of ministries of agriculture in these schemes, the priority they assign to rural development needs to be reinforced. Organisations such as IFAD can make a relevant contribution in this respect.
- **Africa:** To continue opting for a strategy of financial and technical support, through international cooperation agencies and NGOs, in order to contribute to the strengthening of ministries and public services. This strengthening must include the design of formal articulation mechanisms that generate adequate incentives for coordination, taking advantage of the opportunity that a consolidated institutional framework could provide.

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**For more information about the Rural Synergies Project, write to:**

- **Jorge Maldonado**  
[jmaldona@uniandes.edu.co](mailto:jmaldona@uniandes.edu.co)
- **Viviana León-Jurado**  
[dv.leon10@uniandes.edu.co](mailto:dv.leon10@uniandes.edu.co)

**For more information about the Institutional Analysis, write to:**

- **Ignacia Fernández**  
[ifernandez@rimisp.org](mailto:ifernandez@rimisp.org)
- **Tatiana Aguirre**  
[taguirre@rimisp.org](mailto:taguirre@rimisp.org)

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